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Henceforth, whenever jurisdiction exists over a foreign corporation under the CPLR, jurisdiction also exists under BCL § 307,
and service of process may be made on the Secretary of State
followed by delivery of a notice and copy of the process to an
officer or agent of the defendant either personally or by mailing.
It should be noted that the sole significant value of BCL § 307 is
that it provides an alternate means of service upon foreign
corporations.
CPLR 325(c): Wrongful transfer to lower court does not affect
monetary jurisdictional limit of that court.
CPLR 325(c) provides that where it appears that the amount
of damages sustained are less than demanded, and a lower court
would have had jurisdiction but for the amount demanded, the
court in which the action is pending may remove it to the lower
court upon the written consent of the plaintiff and upon the
reduction of the amount demanded to the monetary jurisdictional
limit of the lower court. The consent of the defendant is also
required if the lower court would not have had jurisdiction over the
defendant if the action had been originally commenced there.
In Martin v. Farrell,62 the action had originally been brought
in the supreme court where the relief demanded was $25,000.
Subsequently it was transferred to the Essex County Court. There
was, however, neither plaintiff's written consent for the transfer,
nor a reduction in his demand for relief to $6,000, which was then
63
the monetary jurisdictional limitation of the Essex County Court.
Also lacking was defendant's written consent to the transfer which
was required under CPLR 325(c), since the defendant, a nondomiciliary of Essex County, would not have been subject to the
jurisdiction of the court if the action had been initially brought
there. Neither party, however, made any objection to the transfer
either before or during trial. At the end of the trial, the jury
rendered a verdict for $10,000. Following the verdict the defendant
sought to have it reduced to $6,000. The court, in considering
this motion, held that although the transfer was improper under
CPLR 325(c), both 'the plaintiff and defendant had waived any
right to object to the jurisdiction of the court by impliedly consenting to the transfer and proceeding with the trial.
6247 Misc. 2d 126, 261 N.Y.S.2d 820 (County Ct Essex County 1965).
63JUDicrARY RuLF- § 190(3) states that the monetary jurisdictional limit
of county courts outside New York City is $6,000. This is modified, however,
by subdivision 5 of the same section which enumerates forty-four counties
which are exceptions to subdivision 3 and have a jurisdictional monetary
limitation of $10,000. It should be noted that as of September 1, 1965,
Essex has been added to the latter list of counties and therefore it now
may validly render a judgment up to the limit of $10,000.
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The plaintiff contended, however, that the transfer was not
made pursuant to the CPLR, but instead, was made pursuant to
64
Article 6, Section 19(a) of the New York State Constitution.
Plaintiff further contended that, for transfers made pursuant to
section 19(a), the court was authorized to render a judgment for
$10,000 under section 19(j) which provides that "each court
shall exercise jurisdiction over any action or proceeding transferred
to it pursuant to this section." 65
The court in rejecting plaintiff's contention relied on section
19(k) which states that the legislature nmuy provide that the judgment in a transferred action shall not be subject to the monetary
limitation of the court to which it is transferred. 6 The obvious
inference from section 19(k) is that since the legislature has not
exercised this power, the lower courts are still subject to their
jurisdictional monetary limitations in actions which are transferred
to them.
The instant case illustrates the confusion caused by having
provisions for transferring actions in both the constitution and the
CPLR.
The practitioner should be extremely wary of the fact that
although the great majority of county courts now have a monetary
jurisdictional limitation of $10,000, there are still eighteen counties
which are subject to the limitation of $6,000.
ARTICLE 6-JOINDER OF CLAIMS, CONSOLIDATION AND SEVERANCE

CPLR 603:

Court has discretion to allow severance in furtherance
of convenience or to avoid prejudice.

In Mullett v. Sacco,6 7 plaintiff, a truck driver, sued defendants

as joint tort-feasors for personal injuries sustained as a result of two
separate collisions occurring within a matter of minutes. The
defendants moved pursuant to CPLR 603 for a severance into two
separate causes of action. The court granted the defendants' motion
on the ground that it would be in the furtherance of convenience
since separate charges to the jury would result in a more equitable
assessment of damages. The court, by this action, established a
joint trial under CPLR 602, and thus preserved the integrity of each
64

"The supreme court may transfer any action . . . except one over
which it shall have exclusive jurisdiction which does not depend upon the
monetary amount sought, to any other court having jurisdiction of the
subject matter within the judicial department provided that such other
court has jurisdiction over the classes of persons named as parties . . .
N.Y. CoNsT. art. VI, § 19 (a).

05 N.Y.

CoNST.

art. VI, § 19(j).

66 N.Y. CoNsT. art. VI, § 19(k).
6747 Misc. 2d 441, 262 N.Y.S.2d 796
1965).
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